Decision-making in Conflicts resolution

We have seen in the previous topic trends suggesting that policymakers outside the continent attach a low priority to conflicts in Africa on the whole. This topic aims to investigate why. The decisions of policy makers are formed, to a certain extent, according to internal dynamics, but they are also subject to influences from other actors.

Decision-making in Conflicts resolution

Internal Dynamics

At the level of international organisations, we can focus on the decision-making within the UN Security Council and also on the agencies involved in providing humanitarian aid. We have already discussed how the decisions of the Security Council are the result of compromise and power politics among its members, but how does this work? The five permanent countries on the Council have the power of veto, and thus can unilaterally reject decisions that they feel do not serve their interests.

They can even veto the placing of an item on the Council agenda for discussion. There may also be a certain amount of behind-the-scenes ‘trading’ over issues, country A will allow an initiative of country B in return for country B supporting an initiative raised by country A. Non-permanent members can also wield some influence if their” diplomatic capabilities are strong, but this can be difficult when their term is only two years.

Perhaps more importantly, in the case of conflict in Africa, where there is a lack of interest among members in general, it is extremely difficult to generate support for timely and substantive initiatives. Without a dedicated leader to raise the issue and see it through to the adoption of effective decisions, issues simply do not rise up the agenda.

Basically, it is donors who decide how much money will be given to alleviate suffering in a particular emergency, but it is the agencies that decide the amount of the appeal. Although these appeals supposedly are determined based on needs assessments, they appear to be, more often than not, supply driven rather than demand driven.

Major donors tend to give large amounts of aid after political change that they wish to support, hence the massive amounts of aid to Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq immediately following regime changes seen as favourable to the donors. This is ‘good for business’ for the aid agencies, who welcome the income for their activities. Agencies are also sensitive to which emergencies are unlikely to attract attention and funding, and therefore find themselves forced to draft ‘realistic’ appeals.

Some steps have been taken to improve this situation somewhat, however, with the introduction in 2005 of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which seeks to pool resources that are not earmarked or responses to specific appeals, allowing OCHA greater freedom in responding to neglected emergencies.

At a country level, decision-making mechanisms are highly complex, and their nature depends highly on the individual country in question. In general, the decision-making process in responding to conflict depends largely on three main actors: the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the bureaucracy. Their common mandate is to protect their own national interest, though the perception of the actors of what exactly this entails may be quite diverse. The level of power in each case depends on the political system, the perceived importance of the issue and the level of agreement among these actors. In some instances, the personal dedication to a particular cause by an individual within these groups can have considerable influence.

Overall, geopolitics is a major factor in much of the decision making of policymakers — how important is a region strategically, and how much does it affect the security and economic interests of the nation? The relatively high strategic relevance of Africa during the Cold War saw a significant decline in the 1990s. but it did not mean that all interest was lost.

There are a number of forces at work in this regard: African oil makes up a significant part of Western consumption (although it is concentrated in a few countries); the US desire to contain hostile Sudan influenced much of its policies on the continent; France feels a need to protect its influence and interests on the continent, particularly from Anglophone domination; and China is expanding its trade promotion to meet the needs of its growing economy. But because of the overall decline in strategic relevance of the continent, most of the powerful states appear content to remain on the sidelines as long as they can protect their limited interests.

Relations with other states also have an impact. Some policymakers may be pressured by other states to do something in response to conflict. This may be because initiating states need to attract the support of other states to improve the effectiveness of their action, enhance the legitimacy of their position, or to reduce spread the risk in the case that the results are less than desirable.

This may lead to a ‘bandwagon effect’, where others feel compelled to raise their voices or participate in action of some form out of peer pressure. The reputation of their state is an issue for policymakers. Policymakers are typically, however, risk averse, and will be hesitant to engage in any action in which the risks (to their troops, finances or reputation) are high. Thus, the low geopolitical importance of Africa means that there is less incentive to be proactive.

Within national governments, there may be significant divergence of views on how to respond to certain issues. While ministries of foreign affairs have traditionally dominated issues of foreign affairs, increasing globalisation has meant that more actors are becoming involved and there are more channels for communication on issues of foreign affairs. Executive policymakers may become targets of pressure from opposition parties, from politicians with strong personal views, from ministries (particularly foreign affairs and defense), and from government-run aid agencies.

The ministry of defense may be willing to contribute troops to an intervention in Africa, for example, but the foreign ministry, with other priorities, may view this as a waste of resources, something that is more trouble than it’s worth (Gordon, Miller and Wolpe, 1998: 16-17). The low strategic interest means there is less cohesion in policy — it is more difficult to build consensus for strategy and action within the branches of government.

Media Influence

The media influence the decision-making process of the policymakers because in many ways they form the link between the policymakers and their constituencies. Rightly or wrongly, policymakers tend to view the media as the mouthpiece of public opinion. Policymakers considering a potential course of action in response to a conflict will most likely consider the possibility of media support for such action before making the decision.

More significantly, the tendency of the media to focus their collective attention on a single conflict and to utilise oversimplified and emotive reporting that clearly identifies ‘villains’ and ‘victims’ (as we will see in the following unit) also serves as pressure on policymakers to do something in response to conflict, even where there may be no threat or benefit for their own national interest. Where policymakers already have a clear policy set out, they are likely to resist such pressure, but where there is apathy or clashing opinions within the policymaking circle, the use of such sustained media pressure is likely to have an effect.

But pressure by the media to do something’ where there is no genuine interest, may result in piecemeal ‘actions by policymakers designed simply to alleviate the pressure, rather than actually contribute to conflict resolution. Such actions may be largely for show, with little impact on the ground. Furthermore, even though the media potentially have the power to force the policymakers to pay attention to a particular conflict, they rarely exercise this power with regards to conflicts in Africa (recent attention on Darfur is a rare exception), so their influence is somewhat irrelevant in Africa.

Public Influence

In procedural democracies (where the public has the power to punish and reward politicians at election time based on their actions and their promises) the public has influence over the policymakers through the ballot. But it is not only at election time when they can exert this influence (although at election time it may well be at its strongest).

The public can lobby, petition, or use other forms of advocacy, to encourage their representatives to act in a certain way. In large enough number they can even demonstrate on the streets if they feel strongly enough about an issue. In the case of a conflict or humanitarian crisis, the reputation of policymakers can be damaged through public disapproval if they remain idle. Policymakers may look not only at the levels of media coverage, but also at public opinion polls on any given situation.

Among public actors, certain interest groups may hold greater interest and greater power in influencing policymakers. Such groups include ethnic or religion-based groups (diasporas), as well as business lobbies. In the West, the Jewish lobby is particularly influential in encouraging policies favourable for Israel, largely because of the amounts of money it contributes to the campaign funds of politicians.

Lobby groups for Africa are less organised and less powerful. Sometimes pressure may come for action in opposite directions from different lobby groups. In the case of US policies on Sudan, for example, Christian lobby groups were pushing for greater pressure on the northern government to protect the Christian groups in the south, but at the same time, oil companies were lobbying for a more conciliatory stance to enable them to access oilfields in Sudan.

It is difficult to pin down, however, how much influence the public in general on, the policymakers, and conversely, how much the policymakers are influencing the public by utilising and manipulating public opinion to their advantage. The policymakers may also misread public opinion, especially if they are influenced by powerful interest groups that may have the minority opinion. Furthermore, public interest is more likely to be primarily concerned with domestic issues rather than distant foreign conflicts. Foreign conflicts rarely become election issues unless their own country is involved. Africa in particular is usually seen as being distant from the interests of the Western public, unless they are substantially galvanised by media attention.

Academic Influence

Academics also have the power to influence policy makers. Experts in the field of international relations, politics and security (but outside the government) may be commissioned to conduct studies on security issues affecting their country or the interests of their country. They may conduct workshops and conferences on particular topics that bring in both academics and policymakers to debate on a particular foreign affairs topic. Policymakers involved in foreign affairs are also likely to read journals, and op-ed piece in the newspapers written by academics that are relevant to their activities.

Perhaps more importantly, specialists with academic backgrounds in international affairs are increasingly being drawn in by bureaucracies and governments to serve as consultants, advisors and other positions. Governments fund think tanks to encourage research in certain areas that will benefit the formulation of their policies. This gives academics a certain amount of influence. As a result of this process, there are a number of high profile policymakers who have come from academic backgrounds, including Sadako Ogata (former head of UNHCR), Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, and Condoleezza Rice (former and present US Secretaries of State).

Finally, policymakers may rise to positions due to ambition for power and influence, but they are also concerned about their legacy, i.e., how they, will be remembered in history (particularly during their final terms in office). In this sense, it is not necessarily the active influence of academics on policymakers, but more the role itself of academics as the recorders of history that influences policymakers to attempt to contribute to the resolution of international issues for which they will be ‘remembered in a positive light. The decision of former US President George Bush senior to intervene in Somalia, and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s recent rhetoric on Africa in general may be a reflection of such a concern for their legacy.